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Global energy demand and scarce petroleum resources require communities to adapt to a rapidly
changing Arctic environment, but as well to a transforming socio-economic environment instigated by
oil and gas development. This is illustrated by liqueﬁed natural gas production by Statoil at Hammerfest,
which opened up the Barents Sea for oil and gas drilling. Although environmental organisations, Sámi
indigenous people, ﬁsheries and local inhabitants of Hammerfest try to strive for environmental and
community development in relation to liqueﬁed natural gas production by engaging in negotiations with
Statoil and the Norwegian government, they are overshadowed by economic growth, implemented by a
strong coalition between Statoil and the Norwegian State. Sustainable development of liqueﬁed natural
gas production is therefore constrained by centralized decision-making by the institutional coalition.
Statoil’s concessions on environmental and community development were rather based on cost-efﬁcient
and short-term means. This is strengthened by the fact that contact with stakeholders faded away once
the social license to operate was achieved. This article will analyse why current governance of liqueﬁed
natural gas production at Hammerfest did not move beyond economic development.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The convergence of rapidly increasing global energy demands
and climate change in the Arctic opens up possibilities for oil and
gas companies. At the same time, they face unique challenges. The
Arctic, despite moderating temperatures and retreating sea ice,
remains a harsh environment. Human and environmental safety is
difﬁcult to ensure. The Arctic environment is fragile and recovers
slowly after ecosystem damage [1,2]. Another challenge is that
small, isolated (indigenous) communities, in for example Alaska,
Canada, Russia, the Shetland Islands (United Kingdom (UK)) and
Norway, which are often highly dependent on marine resources
for subsistence, are confronted with large oil and gas companies.
These communities, already exposed to a changing Arctic en-
vironment, are now affected by an external labour force, industrial
development, energy politics and sudden wealth [3,4], but also
with growing tension between these communities, the state and
the oil and gas industry.
In Northern Alaska there is for over thirty years a structural
conﬂict over offshore oil and gas development in the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas, between surface users (Inupiat subsistenceets).hunters), subsurface owners (the state and federal governments
that own the oil and gas rights), and the oil industry. While there
are many opportunities for local involvement in offshore decision
making, cultural factors, local capacity and competing interests
compromise effective use of such opportunities [5,6]. Another
example concerns oil and gas exploitation in Nunavut (Canada).
Although Nunavut does not have any offshore jurisdiction, Inuit
indigenous people rights are protected through various rules and
organizations, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Canadian
Constitution and settled land claim agreements which are treaty
based like the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement [7]. Both in Alaska
and Canada the exploitation of oil and gas reserves has led to the
settlement of indigenous ownership claims. In Russia, on the other
hand, resources have been extracted disregarding local land claims
and involvement. However, the examples of the Yama-Nenets
Autonomous Okrug and the neighbouring union Yerv symbolize a
growing empowerment of indigenous communities in relation to
oil and gas companies [3]. Finally, in 1975 Sullom Voe (Shetland
Islands, UK) was identiﬁed as a location to provide pipeline
terminal and support facilities for offshore oil and gas in the North
Sea. After 30 years of experience, the Sullom Voe terminal has
become a pioneering model of integrated coastal zone manage-
ment based on adaptability and independence from government,
industry and special interest groups [8].
This paper will look into one of such communities,
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northernmost tip of Norway and neighbouring Russia. Hammerf-
est became the capital of Norway's new ‘Arctic Energy Province’
due to oil and gas discoveries pioneered by Statoil's liqueﬁed
natural gas (LNG) plant. During this development, Statoil faced, on
the one hand, technological hurdles and opposition from en-
vironmentalists, sceptical ﬁshermen and a wary local population.
The plant introduced, on the other hand, socio-economic changes
which were welcomed by Hammerfest's community. Finnmark
County, where Hammerfest is located, is highly dependent on re-
sources of the Barents Sea. Until recently this area was known best
for out-migration and a declining ﬁshing industry due to its iso-
lated location and globalization of ﬁsheries [9]. Due to the con-
struction and putting into operation (in 2007) of the LNG plant
Hammerfest experienced a population growth and a thriving
economy [4]. Hence Hammerfest's community needs to adapt to a
rapidly changing Arctic environment, but also to a new socio-
economic environment instigated by oil and gas developments. To
adapt to such changes is particularly challenging for Hammerfest's
community, which resembles characteristics of what is labelled a
‘small island developing state’: a rather isolated territory with
abundant natural resources and limited governance capacity in
terms of human, ﬁnancial, information and other resources [10].
Such areas face challenges in resource management such as lack of
knowledge, lack of resources and a scale mismatch between actors
impacting natural resources and actors preventing/governing such
impacts. Effective governance is crucial for maximizing beneﬁts
and minimizing negative impacts.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the introduction of LNG
production in the community of Hammerfest and the enabling and
constraining conditions of this community to govern environ-
mental consequences of LNG production in Hammerfest. The
central research question is: How is Hammerfest, as an example of
a small island developing state type of community, affected by the
introduction of a new activity, such as a new LNG plant? And in
what way is such a community capable of preserving its vulner-
able marine ecosystem in relation to environmental consequences
of this new activity?
Section two will introduce the theoretical framework. Core
concepts are marine community and the policy arrangements
approach. Section three describes the methodology, while section
four analyze and explains the transformation of Hammerfest's
community around LNG production, based on empirical data from
interviews. This section starts with the reconstruction of the
marine community followed by the implications for sustainableFig. 1. The relation between marine communities and marine ecosystems.development of LNG production in Hammerfest. Section ﬁve pre-
sents the discussion and section six the conclusions and
recommendations.2. Theoretical framework
To analyze socio-economic and political dynamics around LNG
production in Hammerfest in relation to a rapidly changing Arctic
environment, the concept of marine community is introduced. A
marine community is a community of socio-economic and policy
actors and institutions organized around a certain maritime ac-
tivity which inﬂuences or will be affected by the (marine) eco-
system in which the activity takes place. Analytically, in a marine
community two interdependent communities can be dis-
tinguished: a user and a policy community, shown in Fig. 1. Both
communities have a distinctive logic, rationality, purpose and in-
stitutional rules. A user community is a community of inter-
dependent actors that executes and is affected by the maritime
activity and which makes use of the goods and services marine
ecosystems provide [11,12]. A policy community consists of actors
that are part of (in) formal institutions and governance arrange-
ments that regulate maritime activities to realize sustainable use
and management of marine ecosystems [13–15].
To analyze the functioning and development of marine com-
munities the dimensions of the policy arrangement approach are
applied, such as actors and their coalitions, resources, rules of the
game and discourses [22]. This paper focuses on the development
and institutionalization of coalitions and how they make use of the
other dimensions of the policy arrangement approach, in order to
understand the enabling and constraining conditions for sustain-
able development of the marine community in Hammerfest. The
formation of policy coalitions is analyzed from both a strategic and
an institutional perspective. In general, marine communities con-
sist of interdependent state, market, civil society and scientiﬁc
actors (from different levels) who interact with each other in user
and policy communities. The interdependency between actors is
determined by their ability to possess, choose to share and mo-
bilize resources, and to deﬁne and to apply rules of the user and
policy community, based on their perceptions and discourses.
Resources can vary from tangible resources like regulations, ﬁ-
nancial means and databases to less tangible, but equally im-
portant, resources like power, status, legitimacy, knowledge and
information. Rules refer “to the rules of the game currently in
operation, in terms of formal procedures of decision-making and
implementation, as well as informal rules and routines of inter-
action [16]”. Rules thus determine how decision-making takes
place, who is involved and who has access to certain resources.
Perceptions are deﬁnitions or images of reality used by actors to
interpret and to evaluate their actions and those of others [17–20].
Based on these perceptions, “ensembles of ideas, concepts and
categorisations are produced, reproduced and transformed in a
particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to
physical and social realities, the so called policy discourses [21]”.
Guided by policy discourses, actors will decide with whom they
will form a policy coalition in which they share resources and
strategies. As such these policy coalitions will identify similar goals
and therefore engage in policy processes to achieve them. In this
policy process some coalitions might support the dominant policy
discourse or rules of the games, while others will challenge these
[22].
To integrate LNG production in Hammerfest's marine commu-
nity in a sustainable way, forms of governance need to be tailored
and adapted to the (changing) characteristics of the marine com-
munity and marine ecosystem. Therefore this paper will analyze
how the transformation of the marine community has enabled or
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To understand relationships, complexities and institutional
settings within a marine community, a case study design was
chosen. A case study allows the researcher to derive an in-depth
understanding of the research object by looking at a range of
factors, potential causal connections as well as how they change
over time. In addition, this methodology is useful to address ac-
tors’ motives, interpretations, constructions of reality and behavior
[23,24]. Hammerfest was selected as case study because it is a
symbolic push for Arctic oil and gas development as Statoil's LNG
plant reversed the long-standing closure of the Barents Sea for oil
and gas drilling [4]. Other interesting characteristics are coex-
istence with local ﬁsheries and Sámi indigenous people. Further-
more Hammerfest shows different forms of cooperation between a
large oil and gas company and a local municipality. Cooperation is
for example initiated from Statoil's Corporate Social Responsibility
strategy [25] which encompasses the idea that businesses have not
only economic and legal obligations, but also ethical and philan-
thropic responsibilities to society which go beyond making proﬁt
for their shareholders [26]. This paper will investigate how forms
of cooperation between different coalitions affect possibilities for
sustainable development in Hammerfest.
Semi-structured interviews with key informants served to map
the marine community structure and to identify how actors po-
sitioned themselves in coalitions in this community and which
resources, rules, perceptions and discourses they used. Key in-
formants represented national and local governmental authorities,
oil and gas companies and their supply industry, environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), researchers and ﬁsher-
men. Field work at Hammerfest was conducted for two weeks in
October 2014. 14 interviews were conducted in total, of which nine
with a single interviewee and ﬁve with multiple interviewees.
Nine interviews were conducted face-to-face, four by Skype and
two by videoconferencing. Before ﬁeld work started seven ap-
pointments were already made with a selection of interviewees,
based on their role in the marine community. Remaining inter-
viewees resulted from a snowball sampling method inﬂuenced by
the preselected interviewees. Information provided by inter-
viewees was double checked by asking different interviewees the
same information. All interviews were recorded with a voice re-
corder. Interviews were transcribed as soon as possible after the
interview took place. Anonymity of the interviewees was guar-
anteed; therefore a coding system is used for referencing inter-
views in this article (see Table 1). Data analysis is based on tri-
angulation of data from semi-structured interviews, literature re-
view, policy document analysis and participatory observations by
the researcher through labeling and coding with Atlas.ti.Table 1
Coding overview interviewees.
Coding Interviews




I-M-1 to 5 Interviews with market parties from
– Oil and gas companies
– Fisheries
– Supply industry
I-CS-1 to 2 Interviews with environmental non-governmental organizations
I-R-1 to 4 Interviews with national researcher institutes4. A transforming marine community on LNG production in
Hammerfest
Hammerfest is located in Finnmark (see Fig. 2), Norway's most
ﬁshery-dependent county, due to its high adjacency to resources
in the Barents Sea, such as Atlantic cod and herring, and the sig-
niﬁcant amount of Russian landings of cod it receives. Tradition-
ally, ﬁshing villages along the coast of Finnmark are characterized
by their scattered location, limited industrial base and great dis-
tances between populated areas. Large investments by the Nor-
wegian government transformed the marine community in Finn-
mark from a ﬁshing to a ﬁsh processing community in the 1970s.
Afterwards governmental interventions introduced a welfare
policy in Finnmark which resulted in the public sector, followed by
tourism. Nevertheless ﬁsheries still faced resource and market
crises in the 1980s and 1990s [9]. Currently local ﬁshermen feel
threatened by globalization of ﬁsheries; in particular by industrial
ﬁsheries in southern Norway and Russia. As a result Hammerfest's
population declined. Especially young people left due to lack of
future perspective as ﬁshing faired poorly and new business op-
portunities were stagnant [4,24,I-G-3]. Until 2002 Hammerfest's
marine community was highly dependent on ﬁsheries for its li-
velihood and local economy and consisted of a local user com-
munity of ﬁshermen, local inhabitants and Sámi indigenous peo-
ple and a local policy community with the municipality as central
actor. This marine community resembles a one-sided, subsistence-
driven, economy of small island developing states [28].
Because of the exploitation of oil and gas in the Barents Sea and
the development of the LNG plant at Melkøya, Hammerfest
transformed from a local marine ﬁsheries community to a national
(and even international) marine community, with the interna-
tional petroleum industry at its centre. Melkøya is an island, just
west of Hammerfest, which is connected to the mainland through
a tunnel. The LNG plant processes gas from three offshore natural
gas ﬁelds Snøhvit, Albatross and Askeladden in the Barents Sea,
situated 140 km from Hammerfest. Those gas reserves were dis-
covered between 1981 and 1984. Natural gas is distributed
through a pipeline to the processing plant at Melkøya, where it is
converted to LNG (shown in Fig. 3). In 2002 the construction was
approved by the Norwegian government. Since August 2007 the
plant is operational. Initially LNG would be shipped to the United
States of America (USA). However, discoveries of huge amounts of
shale gas transformed the USA from being dependent on import of
oil and gas, to a self-producing country. Currently most LNG is
transshipped to Europe, but the Asian demand is increasing ra-
pidly [26, I-R-4]. This LNG plant is quite remarkable because of its
scale and the technology it applies in the vulnerable Arctic en-
vironment. Gas extraction occurs without surface installations,
because conversion takes place on shore. Instead of ﬁxed or
ﬂoating units, subsea production facilities stand at water depths of
250–345 m on the seabed. Seabed facilities are designed to be
overtrawlable, so that both oil and gas industry and ﬁsheries do
not suffer from any damage by touching the seabed. To reduce
emissions, the plant is designed to capture CO2 which is re-in-
jected in the ﬁeld [30].
Statoil's LNG plant near Hammerfest brought new economic
perspectives to the region, and transformed the marine commu-
nity. The next section will explain the changes in Hammerfest's
marine community by analysing how institutional, strategic and
oppositional coalitions affected the resources, rules and discourses
of the user and policy community.
4.1. Institutional coalition
Since the establishment of Statoil as a state-owned company in
1972, the relation between the Norwegian State and Statoil can be
Fig. 2. The location of Hammerfest [45].
Fig. 3. Overview of the operation of the LNG plant [46] (approved by Statoil).
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lationship based on formal rules that formalizes its inter-
dependency through sharing of resources and discourses. Char-
acteristic for this institutional coalition are its two faces: the ﬁrst
face is the state participant/user relation, the second face is the
regulator/user relation.
Despite several changes, such as increased state participation in
the 1980s and semi-privatization in the 2000s [4], the state par-
ticipant/user relation between the Norwegian government and
Statoil has been institutionalized during the last decades.1 This
relation was further strengthened by initiatives of the Norwegian
government, such as Norwegianization of the oil and gas industry,
by giving preference to domestic oil companies and suppliers [31],
the ‘High North Strategy’ of the Stoltenberg administration with a
renewed interest in Finnmark's economic development, coupled
with offshore oil and gas activities and cooperation with Russia [4]
and Norway's tax efﬁcient system which incentivizes oil and gas
exploration.2
The second face of the institutional coalition represents the
regulator/user relation. Besides participating in oil and gas activ-
ities, the Norwegian State is also responsible for regulating these
activities. Since the 1970s Norway has moved towards a perfor-
mance-based approach to supervise oil and gas activities, in which
the state deﬁnes the performance that needs to be achieved, while
the industry is free to decide how this will be done [32]. The
Petroleum Act (1996) governs petroleum activities, under jur-
isdiction of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and its Petro-
leum Directorate. Before an area is opened up for oil and gas
drilling, a strategic impact assessment is made and the public is
consulted [33]. This is an important moment for other actors (like
research institutes and NGOs) to question the nature and extent of
proposed oil and gas activities in relation to social, economic and
environmental effects (I-R-2;I-CS-1).
The two faces of the Norwegian government (as state partici-
pant and as regulator of oil and gas) could be conﬂicting. Ac-
cording to an NGO, their input is not taken into account and even
overruled by the Norwegian government's face as state partici-
pant: “The Norwegian Polar Institute and the Environment Agency
provide the same input as we do; it is not taken into account. In
Norway the situation is, issuing a consequence analysis equals
opening up the area for oil and gas activities (I-CS-2)”. Once the area
is opened, the most important resource for developing any oil and
gas discovery is the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO)
licensees have to submit. A PDO contains an account of economic,
resource, technical, safety, commercial and environmental aspects,
as well as information as to how a facility may be decommissioned
and disposed of when the petroleum activities have ceased. The
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is authorized to approve a PDO.
Because of the scale of Statoil's LNG plant approval of the Nor-
wegian State was required [31, I-R-4]. In 2007 the LNG plant
started to operate. The Environment Agency and the Petroleum
Safety Authority monitor the environmental impact and safety of
the plant. Statoil reports on compliance with the permits based on
the ‘internal control principle’ (I-CS-1). As Statoil is in charge, they
consult national research institutes to monitor the effects of the
LNG plant on different parts of the environment (I-R-3). In case of
non-compliance, Statoil has a notiﬁcation duty. Afterwards agen-
cies will set a deadline by which non-compliance should be solved.
Results about monitoring and rule compliance are made publicly
available by the agencies at stake (I-G-1; I-G-2; I-M-2; I-CS-1; I-R-1 Currently the Norwegian State has a direct ownership of 67% within Statoil,
managed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Apart from a share within
Statoil, state participation in Statoil's LNG project is even more prominent by the
30% share of the state-owned company Petoro [43].
2 78% of the costs are reimbursed in the subsequent year [44].1). These state agencies represent independently both faces of the
Norwegian State in the institutional coalition. While the Ministry
of Petroleum and its Petroleum Directorate represent state parti-
cipation in Statoil's LNG plant, the Environment Agency and the
Petroleum Safety Authority regulate this industry.
4.2. Strategic coalitions
The strong institutional coalition between the Norwegian State
and Statoil changed the relations between the user and policy
community in Hammerfest. Characteristic for Hammerfest's marine
(ﬁsheries) community is its isolation and lack of resources and
knowledge to counterbalance the power of a multinational com-
pany like Statoil. “Oil and gas companies and the Ministries are the
same people, they have the same interest; they have the license to
operate (I-M-3).” The lack of trust in the Norwegian State's reg-
ulatory face versus its state participant face and the lack of an in-
stitutional coalition between Hammerfest municipality and the
Norwegian State, forced local actors to deﬁne their position in re-
lation to the institutional coalition. Two strategic coalitions
emerged: one between Statoil and ﬁsheries and one between Sta-
toil, Hammerfest municipality and local inhabitants. Each of these
strategic coalitions has its own resources, rules and discourses to
achieve its objectives. Compared to the institutional coalition, these
coalitions have a short-term and strategic character because actors
try to pursue their interest by looking for actors with whom policy
interpretations are shared and acceptable consensus can be
reached, while disregarding actors with conﬂicting policy inter-
pretations [22].
The formation of these coalitions is essential for acquiring a
social license to operate (SLO) for the LNG plant. The concept of a
SLO emerged in the late 1990s, predominantly in the mining in-
dustry [34]. Currently the concept is used in a variety of contexts
ranging from business, academia, and consultants to media. A SLO
is “the ongoing acceptance and approval of the activities of an
industry by local communities and other stakeholders [35]”. Al-
though it is difﬁcult to measure whether or not a SLO has been
granted, Thomson and Boutilier [36] introduce four concepts to
understand how a company like Statoil can obtain and maintain its
SLO. First, economic legitimacy is determined by the level of local
beneﬁts provided by the activity at stake. Second, interactional
trust is based on “the perception that the company listens, re-
sponds, keeps promise, engages in mutual dialogue and exhibits
reciprocity in its interactions [36]”. Thirdly, institutionalized trust
requires stakeholders to perceive that the relationships between
their institutions and the company are based on mutual trust with
respect for each other's interests. Fourth, socio-political legitimacy
is required, and is characterized by fairness, meeting expectations
and contributing to the well-being of a region or a country [36].
4.2.1. Strategic coalition: Statoil and ﬁsheries
Interaction between Statoil and ﬁshermen was triggered by
ﬁshermen's scepticism about the pipeline path connecting off-
shore gas ﬁelds to the LNG plant, released in the construction plan
in 2002. The pipeline crossed important ﬁshing grounds; amongst
others spawning areas for Atlantic cod. As result the ﬁshing
community in Hammerfest was sceptical. However, they choose to
be open-minded to grasp the possibility to inﬂuence the outcome
in their favour, instead of resisting this LNG development. If they
would be successful, they could not only guarantee their liveli-
hood, but their families could also beneﬁt from a more diversiﬁed
economy in times of severe community decline and depression. In
other areas of Norway direct conﬂicts between ﬁsheries and oil
and gas activities are more likely; the narrow continental shelf of
the Lofoten and Vesteralen forces both activities to operate close to
each other, while in the North Sea ﬁxed or ﬂoating, instead of
L.K.J. van Bets et al. / Marine Policy 69 (2016) 52–61 57subsea, oil drilling installations claim large restricted areas for
ﬁsheries [27]. As result ﬁshermen in the North Sea refuse to en-
gage in dialogue with Statoil (I-M-3), or unite with environmental
NGOs in the Lofoten and Vesteralen to successfully halt oil and gas
developments (I-CS-2). A strategic coalition started to develop
through semi-formal meetings between Statoil and ﬁsheries to
defuse the emerging conﬂict about resource overlap (I-R-4).
Fisheries are, next to oil and gas, another important resource on
Norway's continental shelf. Local ﬁshermen of Hammerfest
strengthened their position in this strategic coalition through re-
presentation by the national ﬁshermen organization the Norges
Fiskerlag and the national Directorate of Fisheries. Based on re-
sources, like local knowledge and historic use, ﬁshermen made
clear demands on which a SLO could be granted. After four years of
negotiations, Statoil and ﬁshermen agreed to construct the pipe-
line outside important ﬁshing grounds. The actual construction of
the pipeline was determined by the Ministry of Petroleum and
Energy and deviated partly from the agreement for economic
reasons. This created distrust between ﬁshermen on the one hand
and Statoil and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on the other
hand. This feeling of distrust dissolved afterwards because the
pipeline was constructed under the seabed and covered with rocks
and sand, in order for it to be overtrawlable (I-M-3). Remarkably
the same situation was repeated when the construction of the
electrical cable path deviated from the agreement between ﬁsh-
ermen and ENI Norge, which just started oil production in 2016
from their offshore Goliat platform (I-M-1).
In the end ﬁshermen are not compromised by the LNG plant
and beneﬁt from Hammerfest's improved quality of life, while
Statoil involved ﬁshermen early in the process to gain their SLO.
Fishermen, nevertheless, emphasize the asymmetric power play
during negotiations. Although ﬁshermen felt involved by Statoil, in
the end economic interest is the company's ﬁrst priority. Moreover
ﬁshermen have to sacriﬁce ﬁshing time at sea to engage in talks
with Statoil to save their livelihood, while organizing stakeholder
involvement is part of Statoil's corporate business (I-M-3). One
ﬁsherman summarized the asymmetric power play even as fol-
lows: “Ultimately it is not a decision between ﬁshermen and Statoil,
but by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. The national level de-
cides and the local and regional levels have to play with (I-M-3, I-R-
2)”.
4.2.2. Strategic coalition: Statoil, inhabitants and Hammerfest
municipality
The strategic coalition between Statoil, local inhabitants and
Hammerfest municipality emerged during public meetings in
which Statoil informed local inhabitants about the state of affairs
of the LNG plant and potential incidents (I-M-2; I-G-3). Initially
local inhabitants were enthusiastic about the LNG plant as it might
boost their economy. However, during construction, local in-
habitants faced some unexpected consequences, because Ham-
merfest became invaded by a mobile work force of 3500 em-
ployees, which increased the population with one third. One
consequence of this population increase was the occupation of
tourist accommodations which harmed the tourism industry (In-
terview with Hammerfest Turist in [4]). Moreover local inhabitants
were overwhelmed and diminished visiting bars and restaurants.
This tendency can still be noticed today (I-G-3).
When the LNG plant started to operate, Statoil faced technical
hurdles (I-G-1; I-G-2; I-G-3; I-M-2; I-R-4) and the public started to
raise concerns about health, safety and the environment. An ex-
ample was an unannounced ﬂaring incident, which resulted in a
ﬂame of 130 m height which lightened up the whole city and
which released more CO2 emissions than what had been permitted
for the entire year (I-G-3; I-M-3). During these public meetings,
Hammerfest municipality, the so-called Hammerfest Kommune,facilitated between Statoil and local inhabitants. They actively
engaged in dialogue with Statoil to assure Hammerfest would
beneﬁt directly from this latter development. One major risk
would be a ﬂow of money out of the community to corporate
headquarters in southern Norway. Commitment from active local
organizations and Hammerfest Kommune, but also contributions
from Statoil to local organizations keen on local capacity building
and education like Petro Arctic, Pro Barents AS and Energi Campus
Nord secured a six-fold of intended contracts with local suppliers,
as estimated in 2002 [4].
The most important resource for this strategic coalition is the
annual property tax of ca € 19 million paid by Statoil. Hammerfest
Kommune invests this tax revenue in schools, kindergarten, health
care and the Arctic Culture Centre (I-G-3). Without the property
tax, the situation might have been completely different (I-G-3).
Despite, the revived local economy and increased quality of life,
there are some economic setbacks. Initially the LNG plant would
provide 2000 jobs [4], while currently only 1300 are in place [29].
Recently Statoil even tightened up contracts with the supply in-
dustry because they are able to do it cheaper themselves (I-G-1;
I-G-3; I-M-4). Hammerfest Kommune is worried about employ-
ment prospects for the youth in the oil and gas industry. The local
community is dependent on Statoil's ﬁnancial contributions and
property taxes. But, merely a transfer of money to the community
by Statoil does not stimulate growth or community development,
which is delegated to Hammerfest Kommune [Interview with
Statoil in [4]]. Although Hammerfest Kommune is eager to im-
plement community development and negotiated therefore with
Statoil, it is dependent on respectively Norway's regulatory fra-
mework and decision-making power of Statoil, which is illustrated
by the property tax and the setback in employment (I-G-3).
4.3. Oppositional coalition
Sámi and environmental NGOs are critical about Statoil's LNG
plant. Sámi's main concern is indirect. They are afraid that in-
creased area development and infrastructure in Hammerfest, as
Arctic Energy capital, might claim areas now used for reindeer
herding [4, I-G-3]. Since the Finnmark Act (2005) Sámi have ac-
quired ownership and rights to use land and waters in Finnmark
County. Property disputes and conﬂicts with other users are
managed by the Finnmark Estate Agency, which consists of
members from the Sámi Parliament and Finnmark County Council
[37]. However, there is no legislation that provides Sámi with any
rights to demand compensation or royalties for property claimed
by development of offshore resources like oil and gas in the
Barents Sea [4,38]. In addition, Sámi, unlike ﬁsheries, are not well-
integrated in Hammerfest's community, which disadvantaged
them to engage in a policy coalition with them. In the past, the
Alta Controversy (1978–1982), in which Sámi protested against the
building of a dam that could harm reindeer migration, created
tension in Finnmark. This controversy granted Sámi power
through resources like state protection and property rights under
the abovementioned Finnmark Act, but Norwegians questioned
the legitimacy of empowerment of Sámi which aggravated the
existing tension. This ﬁgurative distance between Hammerfest's
community and Sámi is strengthened by a physical distance
caused by reindeer migration which urges Sámi to pursue a no-
madic culture outside Hammerfest [4]. For these reasons Statoil
did not perceive Sámi as primary stakeholders (I-M-2).
Although environmental NGOs Natur ug Ungdom, WWF Nor-
way and Bellona were sceptical about the environmental perfor-
mance of the LNG plant [27], Statoil got some credibility based on
past negotiations. Statoil and these NGOs were already in dialogue
about the Integrated Management Plan for the Barents Sea and the
Lofoten Islands. This experience and the pressure of the NGOs
Fig. 5. Overview of coalitions in relation to the dimensions of sustainable
development.
Fig. 4. Overview of the coalitions within the marine community around LNG
production at Hammerfest.
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such as carbon capture & storage and reduced emissions of toxic
drilling ﬂuids in the LNG plant [4]. Although NGOs furthermore
lobbied the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of
Climate and Environment and their agencies and organized pro-
tests in Hammerfest, in the end they were rather absent in deci-
sion-making regarding the LNG plant for three reasons. First, NGOs
are willing to accept a SLO for natural gas extraction, but not for
oil. Second, because oil and gas are national resources and man-
aged at the national level, NGOs lobbied the national rather than
the local level. Third, the timing for the LNG plant (in tough eco-
nomic times) in Hammerfest made locals feel that NGOs which
strive for intangible, long-term, macro-environmental interests
interfered with their right to direct economic development. As
result Statoil's discourse of economic revitalization in the North
coupled with oil and gas developments, prioritized at both na-
tional and local level, together with the absence of a locally-based
environmental agenda, hampered national NGOs to introduce a
strong sustainability discourse to inﬂuence this development at
any level. However, Greenpeace Norway keeps an eye on Statoil, as
they own four shares in Statoil's company which grants them ac-
cess to annual meetings of Statoil.
4.4. Marine community
The emergence of these coalitions has affected Hammerfest's
marine community signiﬁcantly. Before the exploitation of LNG
the marine community of Hammerfest was a local, small-scale
community, consisting of a ﬁsheries user community, while
Hammerfest municipality formed the policy community. The start
of LNG production by Statoil transformed the marine community
dramatically. Not only became Statoil the core actor, the institu-
tional coalition between the Norwegian State and Statoil became
the most dominant coalition in this marine community. The for-
mation of coalitions in this marine community is in the ﬁrst place
driven by matching discourses about revitalization of the North by
the Norwegian government coupled with offshore oil and gas
exploration in the Arctic by Statoil. This is further implemented
through national rules like the High North Strategy and Norwe-
gianization of oil and gas and through resources like state parti-
cipation and the Norwegian regulatory system; i.e. a tax efﬁcient
system which incentivizes oil exploration and performance-based
supervision of oil and gas activities which gives Statoil a lot of
operational freedom. This coalition is powerful because both Sta-
toil and the Norwegian State are at the same time part of the user
and policy community. Statoil and the Norwegian State, in fact, use
discourses, rules and resources of the policy community to
strengthen their position as user in the marine community.
Statoil wanted to address local concerns, on the other hand,
and engaged therefore in two strategic coalitions to acquire their
SLO. As such Statoil became the core actor of the marine com-
munity. Local actors, from their point of view, engaged in these
strategic coalitions with Statoil to ensure they would beneﬁt from
the LNG plant. By addressing concerns of ﬁshermen and local in-
habitants on respectively resource overlap and health, safety and
environmental issues, Statoil received a SLO for its LNG plant.
Crucial for the strategic coalition is the matching discourse of joint
economic development of the community and the company. This
is realized through the property tax, implemented by Norway's
regulatory framework, which stimulated the local economy of
Hammerfest.
The oppositional coalition did not become part of the marine
community due to a mismatch in discourses regarding economic
revitalization of the North coupled with oil and gas development,
on the one hand, and sustainable development, based on in-
tangible, long-term and indirect environmental concerns, on theother hand. This was further strengthened by the absence of local
environmental NGOs with whom Sámi and nationally-based NGOs
could form a coalition to mobilize resources and to introduce a
sustainability discourse.
Statoil's position at the core of the marine community and at
the core of two of the three coalitions (see Fig. 4), provokes the
interpretation of a very dense and concentrated marine commu-
nity. However, this is not correct. The strong institutional coalition,
on which both the strategic and oppositional coalitions depend, is
responsible for the scale mismatch between the local user and
national policy community. This scale mismatch is mainly shaped
by the coalitions, but also reinforced by Hammerfest's resem-
blance with small island developing states for the following three
reasons. First, lack of resources and knowledge constrain govern-
ance capacity of the local user community to withstand the power
play of the institutional coalition. As such ﬁshermen were the only
actor in the user community which had valuable resources like
historic use and local knowledge, backed-up by representation of
national ﬁsheries organizations, to inﬂuence decision-making in
the policy community to a certain extent. Second, Hammerfest's
eagerness for employment, government revenues and the transfer
of knowledge and technology, has put Statoil in a powerful posi-
tion to negotiate on taxes, concessions on natural resources and
investment locations. This resulted in a disproportional relation-
ship with the local user community, as local concerns for com-
munity development were overshadowed by economic growth.
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Oslo and the headquarters of Statoil in Stavanger reinforced the
scale mismatch. Although Oslo-based NGOs tried to lobby the
national policy community and to inﬂuence mismatching dis-
courses of economic and sustainable development, the absence of
local NGOs or a strong environmental department of Hammerfest
Kommune made this unsuccessful [4]. Sámi are the closest ex-
ample of a local environmental user community perspective, but
they are not well integrated in Hammerfest's community. There-
fore a push for environmental concerns from a local user com-
munity is largely absent. The local user community, vice versa, did
not manage to get connected to the national policy community,
because there is no strong cooperation between Hammerfest
Kommune and the national policy community. This probably re-
sults from Hammerfest's history as small-scale marine ﬁsheries
community. Economic growth is therefore the dominant discourse
in this marine community because it is pursued by both the na-
tional policy community and local user community, while com-
munity development is mainly addressed by the local user com-
munity and lacks support from the national policy community.
Environmental action is not well represented by both the user and
policy community and is excluded from the core of this marine
community.5. Discussion
How does the change from a local marine (ﬁsheries) commu-
nity to a multi-level marine (oil and gas) community affect pos-
sibilities to govern developments in a sustainable way? Despite
investments in environmental best practices and early and fre-
quent stakeholder dialogue, the dominant discourse of Statoil is
economic growth, which is largely pursued by the institutional
coalition (see Fig. 5). This institutional coalition provides a SLO for
Statoil, mainly based on economic legitimacy and the in-
stitutionalized trust relation between Statoil and the Norwegian
State.
The inclusion of environmental soundness and community
development in governance regarding the LNG plant, strived for by
respectively the oppositional coalition and the strategic coalitions,
are however compromised by Statoil's reliance on cost-efﬁcient
and short-term conﬂict resolution mechanisms. Local actors per-
ceive this as ticking the boxes rather than a long-term investment
towards a SLO, based also on institutionalized trust and socio-
political legitimacy. This can be observed in practice as contacts
with ﬁshermen, local inhabitants and NGOs faded away once an
economic legitimate and interactional trust-based SLO was
achieved [24, I-M-3].
Sustainable development of LNG production at Hammerfest
presupposes that environmental action and community develop-
ment should be addressed equally important as economic growth
at both the user and policy community. This will have con-
sequences for possibilities for sustainable governance of Ham-
merfest's marine community. Decision-making by Hammerfest's
community should incorporate also other actors, even beyond the
existing strategic and oppositional coalitions, for environmental
action and community development, which might lead to a more
sustainable outcome.
Policy making on behalf of the institutional coalition results in
centralized decision-making regarding weighing environmental
consequences and environmental monitoring. Although Norway's
performance-based supervision of oil and gas provides opportu-
nities for exploring different environmental scenarios to reach the
predeﬁned performance by the Norwegian State, so far this does
not occur. Environmental scenarios or approaches to achieve a
certain performance could be weighed differently by differentstakeholders, but are currently mainly valued by the institutional
coalition. Environmental consequences estimated by other stake-
holders, especially those outside the policy arena, are less likely to
be taken into account (I-CS-2). “Environmental NGOs state that there
is a big gap between environmental risk assessments performed by a
consultancy hired by Statoil and one conducted by them, especially
regarding the worst case scenario described in the risk assessment (I-
CS-2).” A similar argumentation applies to environmental mon-
itoring of the LNG plant. Performance-based supervision allows
Statoil to consult national research institutes of their own choice
to monitor different parts of the environment, which are not al-
lowed to advise Statoil in policy making (I-CS-2). Monitoring re-
sults are submitted by Statoil and discussed one-on-one with the
state agency at stake. As a result research is broken up across
different research institutes and state agencies with different
scopes and little communication between them (I-G-2; I-CS-2). In
the end knowledge in this marine community is concentrated in
the national policy community which compromized access to this
knowledge for all stakeholders (I-G-3). In fact Statoil becomes
rather powerful due to this monitoring system because it is the
only actor who has a proper overview of all available knowledge.
To reduce tension between eagerness for community devel-
opment in Hammerfest and centralized decision-making, Ham-
merfest Kommune should function more as a bridging organiza-
tion, i.e. an organization designed to facilitate collaboration and
knowledge coproduction among resource users, researchers and
resource managers to create continuous learning [39–41]. They can
make the national policy community more aware of local con-
cerns. In relation to the local user community, Hammerfest Kom-
mune should take over Statoil's role as organizer of stakeholder
outreach by organizing public meetings. As a result Statoil, dis-
tracted and fatigued by different stakeholder demands [4], can
delegate the responsibility for community development to Ham-
merfest Kommune. Hammerfest Kommune can build on successes
and errors experienced in past public meetings organized by Sta-
toil to address current issues, but also to be better prepared for the
rather uncertain future, because decreasing oil prices have frozen
Arctic oil and gas projects [42]. Although this would beneﬁt
bridging the local to national level, it does not yet deal with
asymmetries in power and interests. The national policy commu-
nity should be responsible to address this. However in the current
Norwegian regulatory framework, a dedicated institution con-
cerned with protecting stakeholders affected by oil and gas pro-
duction is absent [4].6. Conclusions and recommendations
This paper has shown that governance of LNG production by
Hammerfest's marine community around LNG production rather
represents economic than environmental and community devel-
opment. The framework of marine communities and coalitions
provides a better understanding why current governance of LNG
production at Hammerfest did not move beyond economic
development.
The marine community concept enlightens which actors and
levels dominate the user and/or policy community, for what rea-
sons and if and how they interact with each other. Hammerfest's
marine community (both the policy and user community) on LNG
production is dominated by the institutional coalition (Statoil and
the Norwegian State). This powerful coalition is, apart from its
actors and their coalitions, self-reinforced through the other di-
mensions of the policy arrangements approach, namely matching
economic discourses and its implementation through resources
and rules. As result policy making is largely dominated by this
institutional coalition, which impedes strategic and oppositional
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merfest's similarities with small island developing states. Al-
though the local user community tries to protect their high re-
source dependency by engaging in two strategic coalitions with
Statoil, they lack resources and rules to inﬂuence policy-making. In
the end the outcomes of both strategic coalitions are determined
by resources, rules and discourses of the institutional coalition.
The oppositional coalition is less successful, because their long-
term environmental discourse is not pursued by other actors in the
marine community. As such they cannot rely on any dimension of
the policy arrangement for forming a policy coalition like sharing
resources and strategies or pursuing similar discourses.
Hammerfest's marine community is characterized by the ten-
sion between economic and sustainable development and asym-
metric power relations between the national institutional coalition
and the rather local strategic and oppositional coalitions. Cen-
tralized decision-making power by the institutional coalition
constrains knowledge sharing between actors of the institutional,
strategic and oppositional coalitions and hampers effective and
long-term conﬂict resolution in Hammerfest's marine community.
To deal with environmental and community interests, within the
context of centralized decision-making, the countervailing power
between the institutional coalition on the one hand and the
strategic and oppositional coalitions on the other, should be
brought more in balance. An example of bringing both coalitions
more in balance is to develop forms of ecosystem-based mon-
itoring in which state agencies, Statoil and research institutes on
the one hand and local actors on the other hand exchange
knowledge and learn from each other emphasizing sustainable
development. Continued public meetings, facilitated by Ham-
merfest Kommune, will increase attention for community devel-
opment in Hammerfest, beyond the transfer of ﬁnancial means by
Statoil. To balance power relations among community develop-
ment, the Norwegian State, should, next to its face as state parti-
cipant, strengthen its face as regulator, especially to protect local
communities affected by oil and gas activities, which is currently
absent in Norway's regulatory framework [4].Acknowledgements
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